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Introduction 
Risk management is an essential element of a coach’s skill set (Ferrero, 2007) and, reflecting 
this central role, the topic plays a small but significant part in the vast majority of coach education 
programs (cf. British Canoe Union, 2007). For the outdoor professional, however, risk management is 
a more subtle and wider ranging skill (Collins & Collins, 2012). This distinction presents challenges 
for the Adventure Sports Coach (ASC) who must optimally manage the inherent risks associated with 
Adventure Sports (AS), such as rock climbing, mountaineering, sea kayaking, white water kayaking, 
canoeing and caving, against the longer term developmental needs and shorter term stated goals of 
clients. 
All AS are characterized by a degree of risk, since they require specific technical skills, 
possess an element of physical challenge and occur in a continually changing, (largely) non-
competitive and dynamic environment. One key characteristic of this challenge is that risk plays a 
central role in adventure, has a synergetic relationship with the challenge and is often a major factor in 
participation. Indeed, participants may seek out the input from the ASC to allow them to better their 
own experience and develop skills that support their high pressure, ‘in the field’ decision making. In 
this regard, Brevik (2007, p. 11) states, “we should confront danger and take calculated risks, but only 
when we have developed the necessary skills and experience” thereby illustrating the dilemma that, in 
developing the skills, learners will almost inevitably experience danger and risk. Based on this 
observation, the appropriate preparation of the ASC is even more crucial to ensuring a safe, effective 
and enjoyable experience for participants. 
In response to this need, Collins and Collins (2012) attempt to conceptualize the role of the 
ASC, proposing that the broad range of motivations for participation in AS creates the parallel need 
for a broad skill-set for the ASC. The ASC requiring a pedagogic skill set that encompasses coaching, 
leadership and personal development skills in order to respond to the differentiated needs of a client 
group. Furthermore, the nature of AS generates a need for a personal ability in the activity itself that 
underpins these professional skills, this does not require the ASC to be a high performer but certainly 
to be skillfully independent in the teaching and adventure environment. These components, coaching, 
leadership, development and personal ability, must also be integrated with highly developed judgment 
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and decision-making skills. In short, the major characteristics required of the ASC seem best 
described as both diverse and integrated while operating synergistically. These characteristics are 
summarized in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptualization of the adventure sports coach, adapted from Collins & Collins 
(2012). 
Different Approaches to Risk Management 
Clearly, the ASC must deploy a careful and considered approach to risk management, 
balancing the challenge of an activity with the potential benefits, while maintaining a level of risk that 
is authentic for the learner. In contrast, perhaps, to other sports, risk is perceived as a central 
component of outdoor education (Brown & Fraser, 2009; Wurdinger, 1997), one that must be 
exploited rather than minimized. (Priest & Gass, 2005) recognize this as the ‘central paradox’ for 
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adventure experiences. The ‘traditional’ approaches to risk assessment typically employed by other 
sports, such as the Health and Safety Executive’s ‘five steps to risk assessment’ (2006), namely 
hazard identification, identification of those at risk, risk evaluation and control, recording of actions 
and review of assessment, unfortunately, frequently lacks the adaptability necessary to accommodate 
the dynamic environments encountered in adventure activities. This ‘schizophrenia’ between the need 
to control risk and simultaneously utilize it is a significant challenge for the practicing ASC. 
  When addressing these issues, risk-benefit analysis (Ball, Gill, & Spiegel, 2008; Gill, 2010) is 
seen as a logical and essential progression from the simpler risk elimination approaches which 
characterize the methods taught in most coach education programs in other more traditional sports 
and, unfortunately, still in many ASC programs. Risk benefit analysis is increasingly common in the 
UK, both in education and AS environments. For example, Priest and Gass (2005, p. 93) state, “You 
need a clear understanding of the benefits of risk taking in order to determine whether these benefits 
outweigh the risk.” Indeed, Young (2010) recognizes the practice in a broader setting and advocates 
that all educational risk management should be based around risk benefit analysis. In such an 
approach, coaches, teachers and leaders across sports would generate all assessments built around a 
‘justification’ of stated risks against the benefits shown to flow from them. Debate will remain on a 
society’s wider acceptance that there is value in risk taking, although ultimately this may align with 
the professional AS community’s acceptance of the educational benefit. 
Thus, against this backdrop, and in contrast to the history and culture of ‘minimizing’ risk, the 
issue is now one of focusing on and understanding the benefit in order to exploit it, rather than just an 
emphasis on negative implications alone. As reflected earlier, the overall benefit of exposure to risk 
during human development is increasingly being recognized (Tovey, 2007) and an understanding that 
challenge is essential in a healthy and developing society (Moxnes, 1989) has produced a shift in 
thinking. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) suggests that this ‘risky edge,’ the feeling of being stretched, can 
stimulate learning behavior. Changes may also, in part, reflect a growing trend against the 
‘compensation culture’1 (Young, 2010) and a broader acceptance that personal responsibility cannot 
be abdicated in a modern society. 
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Further, however, we suggest that risk-benefit analysis should be extended when used by the 
ASC so as to produce an approach in which risks are still identified ‘up front,’ but which are then 
immediately considered against their potential for exploitation rather than elimination or justification: 
an additional or even distinct complication that requires the perception of risk as both a positive and 
negative factor in the decision making process (Chambers, Odeggard, & Rinaldi, 2007; McDaniels & 
Small, 2004). Of course, this enhanced risk benefit analysis approach assumes that the ASC is capable 
of detecting, understanding and empathizing with the individual participant’s perceptions and 
understanding of risk, and is able to integrate this with the risks presented by the environment. Brown 
and Fraser (2009) highlight the complexities associated with decision making in this manner, an 
additional challenge that almost inevitably requires some differences in the process of coach planning, 
in event actions and in preparation. Whatever the underlying causes, however, there is an increasing 
acknowledgement that risk benefit is a more effective and parsimonious method than the five steps 
model, at least for ASCs. However to apply this approach effectively a clear understanding of the 
potential benefits will be required. 
Understanding the Benefits in Risk Benefit Analysis 
Traditionally, the benefits of adventure, outdoor, and experiential educative approaches have 
been difficult to quantify, especially from a personal development perspective. Different authors 
identify a range of benefits that encompass the short, medium and long term. Unsurprisingly perhaps, 
these often appear to relate to the specified learning outcomes of the program undertaken (Hattie, 
Marsh, Neill, & Richards, 1997; Gassner & Russel, 2008). While supporting this approach, Hunt 
(1990) highlights the difficulty in quantifying the educational benefit and suggests that discussions 
frequently focus on learning outcomes as a way of defining this gain. However these are 
operationalized, their nature is often of a higher order; they are skills, attitudes and competencies, for 
example which are proposed or even expected to transfer from the adventure setting into ‘normal’ life 
(cf., Hattie et al., 1997; Gassner & Russel, 2008). For the educationalist this lack of clarity remains a 
complex challenge. 
Of course, for the ASC benefit may be more easily quantified at a lower and more 
‘immediate’ level, in terms of improved performance. A clear mental model of an ‘ideal’ performance 
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(e.g., what the new skill will look like) enables the coach to make a qualitative assessment based on 
observation, questioning and improvement, thereby ‘justifying’ the exposure to risk. Even here, 
however, the more complex and hard to define psychological benefits, such as confidence and focus, 
also play a part since they contribute to the level of performance that may be achieved. 
Whichever way the benefits are defined and conceptualized, however, this must form a 
central part of the pre-planning structure and in-event action with regard to risk management. Hunt 
(1990) suggests that this is an ‘ethical problem’ which may be addressed by quantifying risk and 
benefit into independent sets of numbers that could be compared, a solution also proposed by Wilson 
and Crouch (2001). However, Hunt (1990) also acknowledges that this approach does not reflect the 
complexity of risk and the variety of the environments that characterize AS, implicitly acknowledging 
the complexity of the decision making process which underpins the risk benefit trade-off. Risk is 
frequently understood in negative terms; Lupton and Tulloch (2002) claiming it is synonymous with 
danger and hazard, whereas Ward (2008) links risk to unacceptable threats that can be physical, 
financial, psychological, or social. Crucially, however, Ward also identifies that risk is not only a 
negative impact or threat but it can also be positive or beneficial (cf. Moxnes, 1989). 
By contrast, the risk benefit analysis advocated by Ball et al. (2008) is a descriptive, non-
formulaic approach that, in itself, may have inherent problematic issues; most notably, that of 
qualifying the potential benefit of the activity. Ball et al.’s model is based on the premise that 
‘experts’ can make sound judgments about risks and benefits in their fields of expertise. In an AS 
context this may have to be explored further, as an inconsistent mental model of performance may 
make analysis on this ‘personal perception’ basis potentially flawed. 
Equally, the personal nature of learning, motivation and risk perception will also impact on 
this perceptual process: namely, one participant benefits from a learning experience may well be 
different from the benefit experienced by another. Although such inter-individual contrasts may be 
desirable and reflect differentiated learning requirements, they make it very difficult to accurately 
identify all the benefits for all the participant’s. Furthermore, each participant’s perception of risk will 
vary; both generically based on their personality and previous experience, and dynamically through 
the activity based on an interaction of these factors with aspects of the environment, including the 
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coach’s behavior. These individual concerns just further complicate the already difficult issue of 
managing risk/benefit. 
Perceptions of risk may be influenced by many factors (Breakwell, 2007; Wilson & Crouch, 
2001), not least the individual’s interpretation of their own experience (Breakwell, 2007). ASCs 
create their perceptions in response to extensive experience over a period of time, which clients 
through necessity do so from a more limited experience, however. This mismatch has the potential for 
a further conflict between the desired impact of an experience designed by the ASC and the actual 
impact on the student. For example, Brymer and Gray (2010) suggested that the younger demographic 
of participants may be the ‘thrill seekers’ while older participants more commonly seek out 
interaction with the environment as a primary orientation. Older ASCs may have different perceptions 
of management of risk from those of younger participants or coaches (Breakwell, 2007). Perceptions 
of risk, benefit, and impact on the learner will directly inform the utilization of risk in practice. The 
decision making process by the ASC on how to optimize the experience of learning by exploiting risk 
will be complex. 
Exploiting the Benefits: Decision Making in Relation to Risk 
Cross (1999), Lyle and Cushion (2010), and Martin, Cashel, Wagstaff, and Breunig (2006) all 
suggest that the collection of information is fundamental in coach decision making. They propose that 
effective decision-making involves creating events and changing the future while also acknowledging 
that a lack of action may also lead to change. This logically suggests that the decision on whether to 
make a decision or not will, in itself, lead to other related decisions in dynamic environments. In 
simple terms, even doing nothing is changing something! This concept of parallel agendas, or nested 
thinking (Abraham & Collins, 2011), has a direct relevance in the risk management process for ASCs, 
in that decisions will be not only be taken against immediate challenges (such as risk) but also with a 
view to longer term agendas such as participant benefit. The initial decision whether to act on 
information, store it for later or ignore it is fundamental. The need for ASC to make decisions 
regarding changing weather during a day-long coaching session and its impact on content, duration 
and venue in the immediate, short, mid and longer term provides a potent example of the dynamical 
challenge faced by the ASC. 
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Simon (1956) considers that classic decision-making models are linear/rational processes that 
are devoid of emotion. Thompson and Dowding (2002) describe this rational part as normative, 
assuming that the decision maker is being logical, rational and acting in an ideal world. Under these 
approaches, the quality of the decision relates directly to outcome. More recently, however, 
naturalistic decision making (NDM-Klein, 2008; Zsambok & Klein, 1997) approaches have offered a 
more parsimonious account for coach decision making, especially in-event, where decisions are often 
high stakes and time pressured. Working from this NDM perspective, Cioffi and Markham (1997) 
recognize the part that emotions play and consider this in relation to intuitions. Such ‘gut feel’ 
decision-making has a long tradition in coaching (cf. Nash & Collins, 2006) and even more overtly in 
the case of the ASC. 
In this regard, Thompson and Dowding (2002) acknowledge intuition as a component of 
expert practice but also recognize a lack of consensus on the meaning of the term: English (1993) 
reports that intuitions are questionable, while Effken (2001) suggest they are subjective, 
immeasurable and un-teachable. It is our contention that intuition may be difficult to quantify and 
therefore to teach and learn but they are not un-teachable. Clearly, someone’s intuitive drives have 
evolved from somewhere and, almost by definition therefore, must at some earlier stage have been 
conscious and rationalized. From a theoretical perspective, intuitive decisions equally appear to relate 
to a heuristics approach to decision making (Breakwell, 2007) and are particularly pertinent to the 
ASC given the frequency of self-reported, ‘feels right’ decision making (McCammon, 2004). In this 
regard, Stanovichand West (2000) propose a dual process in which decision making may have both 
emotive and logical parts; a structure that may explain McCammon’s ‘feel’ right reports. Thus, yet 
another complicating factor comes into the risk-benefit decision, namely the coach’s inclination 
towards making this ‘feels’ right decisions. The weaknesses of these intuitive approaches are clearly 
outlined in avalanche prediction and risk management decisions by McCammon (2004). He proposed 
that six heuristic ‘traps’ can compromise the decision making process in an outdoor context: 
familiarity with the context of the decision (familiarity with venue), consistency and alignment with 
other decisions (a fixed plan), acceptance of the levels of risk associated with making the decision 
(‘it’s my job to make hard calls’), a false sense of security or heightened expectation as the expert 
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halo (‘I’m the expert and always make good calls’), social impacts in the decision and scarcity of the 
conditions for the activity (it’s a powder day!). Galloway (2005) suggests ‘satisficing,’ acceptance of 
the first workable option, and ‘de-minimus,’ emotional attachment to the goal, as further traps while 
Clements (1997) suggests ignorance of the context and Stemba (2005) the positive outcome, ‘it can’t 
happen to me’ trap. All these traps have significant impact in ‘marginal’ decisions, in which the risk 
level and likelihood of incidence is both moderate to high, namely the most challenging! Of course, it 
must be acknowledged that the ability to make such judgments with apparent ease and success 
appears highly regarded, at least in the sports coaching world where such things have been evaluated 
(Abraham & Collins, 2011). Yet again, the need for more applied research is highlighted so that this 
highly regarded skill may be optimally developed. 
Specifically, such research must examine the process by which a skillful decision maker 
reaches a judgment in dynamic environments such as the outdoors. Kahneman and Klien (2009) 
consider heuristic and NDM processes. Both approaches have significant areas of commonality. For 
example, the traps highlighted earlier have the potential to affect both heuristic and naturalistic 
processes, especially given the personal nature and degree of impact on the individual. The degree of 
each trap’s impact appears to depend on the situation, the desired outcome, the ‘validity of the 
experience,’ the role/position within the group and the personality of the decision maker. 
Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider these traps in the outdoor context as significant but to 
differing extents, based on the breadth and depth of the decision maker’s experience, confidence, 
position in the group, understanding of the process and context. Finally, it should be recognized that 
McCammon’s research focused on informally led groups. Accordingly, a refocusing on the 
professional judgment and decision making process of more formally led groups may lead to 
adaptation of the traps or discovery of new ones to reflect professional pressures. 
Against the backdrop of these potential pitfalls, an expert decision maker will need be aware 
of the shortcomings in different approaches and able to monitor and modify style accordingly. Thus, 
the decision maker’s ability to recognize situations/clues and commonalities in which specific 
processes may or may not be appropriate would suggest an ongoing attention to factors in both 
environment and participants. It is logical to consider that, in this context, these decisions may well be 
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both heuristic and naturalistic to some extent. Accordingly, the knowledge required to recognize the 
values and weakness of both (and adjust accordingly) could be considered a meta-judgment, in that an 
evaluation (decision) about how these factors are changing and what this means precedes a second 
decision about what to do. This will directly relate to how the coach has ‘constructed’ the decision 
making model which, in turn, will be related to how experience is gained and reflected on and the 
nature of that knowledge. Supporting this chain of reasoning, Martin et al. (2006) recognize reflection 
as key to developing judgment. 
Awareness, self-management and appraisal are key elements of meta-judgment in practice. As 
such, they are important features of coach development that, we suggest, may currently not receive 
sufficient (or sufficiently formal) attention in training, certification and on-going professional 
development, particularly in ASCs. This concern notwithstanding, it appears that the components of 
meta-judgment practice are congruent with reflective activity; this reflective process making explicit 
what may be originally tacit (Polyani, 1966; Nash & Collins, 2006), enabling post hoc rationalizations 
of action taken in the ‘heat of the moment.’ 
Training to Realize the Benefits: Reflection in Professional Judgment and Decision Making 
Explicit comprehension of meta-judgment appears to form an important part of the 
professional judgment and decision-making (PJDM) repertoire for the ASC (cf. Martindale & Collins, 
2010; Abraham & Collins, 2011). This involves explicit reflection in order to identify the declarative 
knowledge required to support and evolve that process. In this context, these meta-judgments may 
remain both intuitive and analytical in nature, exploiting both tacit and explicit knowledge bases in 
tandem. 
Accordingly, the decision making abilities of an outdoor professional rely on a synergy of off-
line activity, including knowledge, experience, and self-reflection, as well as the more usually 
expected (and logged) practical time served on the hill/sea/river. The sub-conscious ‘construction’ of 
tacit knowledge acts to interpret and simplify complex information and appears to support a heuristic 
view (Guthrie, 1996) while creating explicit knowledge groups and relating variables together 
supports a more naturalistic process. It also seems likely that these synergetic processes sit within a 
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nested decision making process (Abraham & Collins, 2011). Interestingly, Nonaka (2009) suggests 
that these interactions are characterized as occurring in various environments; tacit to tacit exchange 
in a social context, explicit to explicit, in academic contexts, explicit to tacit and—tacit to explicit—in 
‘pracademic’ contexts via some grounded theory and action-based research in which practitioner 
assumptions and experiences are challenged and explored through reflective practice. If this were true, 
then it would be interesting to assay the extent to which all four could play a part in ASC development 
systems. 
The breakthrough in understanding decision making in relation to risk management will occur 
when there is mobilization of that knowledge; in other words, we carefully monitor what happens in 
practice against what ‘experts’ say they want to achieve. Tracking the long-term changes in coaches’ 
thinking and behavior as a result of training and development activities will be another important step. 
Tacit knowledge often forms the basis of practitioner judgment. Investigation in the field to make 
explicit the decision making process will directly inform the tuition of decision making skills in ASC 
education, reflective practice being an essential element in that process and contributing to PJDM. 
Reflection in PJDM 
Anecdotally, good judgment is linked to experience and it is this idea that, at first glance, 
superficially supports a heuristic approach. However, Martin et al. (2006) stress the significance of 
reflection in the development of good judgment. The simplistic notion that good judgment comes 
from experience and that experience comes from bad judgment fails to recognize the value of 
reflection. It appears sensible to conclude that effective reflection on previous ‘bad judgments’ would, 
if appropriate in style and impact, support both professional and meta-judgment in future decision 
making for the ASC. Decision-making in this context is very complex, however, and is a synergy of 
processes facilitated by reflection. The explicit interaction (Polyani, 1962) of the analytic and intuitive 
elements acts as a ‘force multiplier’ and is as critical as the individual parts: the sum being greater 
than the value of the component parts. A synergetic relationship between the emotive and logical parts 
of dual process theory (Stanovich & West, 2000) is, therefore, the desired outcome of any ASC 
development process. 
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Reflection in this context needs to take place both on and in action (Schön, 1983), especially 
given the time periods and environments associated with adventure activities and the nested nature of 
the process. AS are not necessarily riskier in absolute terms than other activities. Rather, it is the 
nature of the risk, being omnipresent and ultimately uncontrollable, that characterizes the activity. 
This prevents ‘stop and think’ approaches espoused in more ‘conventional’ sports (cf. Schön, 1983). 
Accordingly, the reflective process must be positioned within the changing environment, linking the 
environment and decisions drawing on prior experience in that environment and situation while 
anticipating the future decisions and events that may develop. We suggest that multilevel, nested 
reflection is integral to nested decision making. 
  Yet again, a wide variety of research questions emerge. Do ASCs create time for 
reflection/decision-making? Is this ad-hoc, taking opportunity when it arises or rather, is it a 
considered aspect of the coaching process? Namely is opportunity created in the process? Further 
research into this practical aspect of the decision making process will be required in order to establish 
the tacit or explicit natures of the decision making process on ASC practice. 
Conclusion 
Enhanced risk benefit analysis is a distinct and crucial process for the ASC; a focus on the 
benefits, rather than on the elimination of risk is fundamental and matched with a deep 
comprehension of the individual response to risk. It is clear that increasing the level of risk will not 
automatically equate to better learning (Wolf & Samdahl, 2005) and that educational objectives may 
be better met by changes to the pedagogic elements of the process (Brown & Fraser, 2009). However, 
ASCs while working to develop a technical performance may adopt a process of hazard identification, 
risk assessment and manipulation of the perceived and real dangers in order to maximize potential 
benefit is underpinned by a complex decision making process in which emphasis must be placed on 
the positive and negative aspects associated with risk taking if balanced against any perceived benefit. 
Given the current ‘risk averse’ culture, understanding and explaining the benefits is a key precursor to 
the decision making process if judgments are to fit in with others’ perceptions of what is acceptable. 
This is, at present, a feature from a legislative sense in which peer opinions form a crucial part of 
13 
 
criminal court case against malpractice and/or negligence, including inappropriate risk and decision 
making! 
In summary, ASC decision-making is not without its own inherent risks, a critical part of this 
process is the ability to recognize the benefits and that this relies on the ‘expertise’ in decision-making 
ability of the ASC. This, in turn, has a direct implication on the training and accreditation of ASCs. 
Making decisions based on the characteristics and styles of acknowledged experts (rather than just 
copying their decisions!) will facilitate better judgment at all levels. As McCammon (2004) identified, 
the tuition of judgment and decision-making appears crucial yet is conspicuous in its absence from 
most ASC, guide, and outdoor educational and governing body programs. Effective decision-making 
is the ‘glue’ that binds the skill of the ASC as, we suggest, is also the case for the sports coach, 
outdoor leader and educator. Therefore, to create the adaptive expertise required, attention must be 
paid to the decision-making skills of the individuals involved if we are to ensure effective, safe and 
good quality coaching practice. 
Of course, these conclusions all require further research and investigation in a manner that 
reflects the pracademic reality of decision making in relation to risk exploitation in ASC. We are 
currently working to create an empirical base through a process of collaborative research with 
academic and practitioners. This mixed method approach will enable us to identify and design a 
model for professional judgment and decision making in adventure sports and outdoor education that 
has both a practical and academic credibility. It is hoped that this will further inform the debate which 
we hope this paper will stimulate. 
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Note  
1. The culture in which an individual is focused on attempts to gain compensation for any 
suffering, loss, or damage caused by another individual or organization. 
